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Beyond Human, Beyond Words:




Critical pedagogy, even as inflected by certain poststructuralisms, tends to reinforce
rather than subvert deep-seated humanist assumptions about humans and nature
by taking for granted the borders that define nature as the devalued Other. These
assumptions are called into question by discussion of how relationships between
language, communication, and meaningful experience are conceptualized outside
the field of critical pedagogy. We deal constructively with some anthropocentric
blind spots within critical pedagogy generally and within poststructuralist ap-
proaches to critical pedagogy in particular. We hope to illuminate places where
these streams of thought and practice move in directions compatible with critical
environmental education.
La pédagogie critique, même celle de quelques poststructuralismes, a tendance à
renforcer plutôt que de mettre en doute certains postulats humanistes selon lesquels
la nature est, pour les êtres humains, l’Autre dévalué. Ces postulats sont remis en
question dans les analyses portant sur le mode de conceptualisation, en dehors du
champ de la pédagogie critique, des relations entre le langage, la communication
et l’expérience signifiante. Les auteures traitent de quelques présupposés anthro-
pocentriques de la pédagogie critique, en particulier dans ses approches post-
structuralistes. Elles espèrent ainsi éclairer des courants théoriques et pratiques
compatibles entre la pédagogie critique et le respect de l’environnement.
For the largest part of our species’ existence, humans have negotiated relationships
with every aspect of the sensuous surroundings, exchanging possibilities with every
flapping form, with each textured surface and shivering entity that we happened
to focus upon. All could speak, articulating in gesture and whistle and sigh a
shifting web of meanings that we felt on our skin or inhaled through our nostrils
or focused with our listening ears, and to which we replied . . . (Abram, 1996, p. ix)
. . . it is language in the form of conflicting discourses which constitutes us as
conscious thinking subjects and enables us to give meaning to the world and to act
to transform it. (Weedon, 1987, p. 32)
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Poststructuralist theories have provided a discursive framework through
which to critique and contest many of the key tenets of humanism. In
drawing attention to the cultural and historical specificity of all human
knowledge, they have been used to disrupt assumptions about objectivity,
the unified subject, and the universality of human experience, and thereby
to expose the classist, racist, sexist, and heterosexist underpinnings of
Western humanist thought. For this reason poststructuralism offers
promising theoretical perspectives for educators who wish to challenge
cultural representations and structures that give rise to inequities.
Although we acknowledge the important contribution of poststructur-
alism to analyses of oppression, privilege, and power in education, we
believe that educators must continue to probe its limitations and impli-
cations. Accordingly, we consider here how poststructuralism, as it is taken
up within critical pedagogy, tends to reinforce rather than subvert deep-
seated humanist assumptions about humans and nature by taking for
granted the “borders” (as in Giroux, 1991) that define nature as the deval-
ued Other. We ask what meanings and voices have been pre-empted by the
virtually exclusive focus on humans and human language in a human-
centred epistemological framework. At the same time, we discuss how
relationships between language, communication, and meaningful experi-
ence are being conceptualized outside the field of critical pedagogy (in
some cases from a poststructuralist perspective) to call into question these
very assumptions. Although we concentrate primarily on societal narra-
tives that shape understandings of human and nature, we also touch on
two related issues of language: the “forgetting” of nonverbal, somatic
experience and the misplaced presumption of human superiority based on
linguistic capabilities. In so doing, our intention is to deal constructively
with some of the anthropocentric blind spots within critical pedagogy
generally and within poststructuralist approaches to critical pedagogy in
particular. We hope to illuminate places where these streams of thought
and practice move in directions compatible with our own aspirations as
educators.
To borrow from poststructuralism and yet remain within a critical
pedagogy framework gives rise, of course, to inevitable tensions. Criti-
cal pedagogy continues earlier traditions such as “progressive,” “radical,”
“emancipatory,” and “liberation” pedagogies whose root metaphors are
distinctly modern (see Bowers, 1993a, pp. 25–26.). Poststructuralism, how-
ever, brings into play postmodern perspectives and methods of analysis
that challenge modernist notions of, for example, freedom, history and
progress, rationality, and subjectivity. Nevertheless, poststructuralism has
influenced critical theories of education for over a decade, generating
fruitful discussions about epistemic certainty, master narratives, stable
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signifiers, and essentialized identities. As environmental educators, we
have found poststructuralism, in concert with the many other theoretical
perspectives informing critical pedagogy (e.g., feminism, Marxism,
antiracism, Freudian theory, popular education), to be useful in our efforts
to come to terms with dominant assumptions about education.
We recognize, furthermore, that poststructuralism as it is taken up
within critical pedagogy is only one manifestation of poststructuralist
approaches in the human sciences. The term poststructuralist applies to a
range of (not necessarily coherent) theoretical perspectives. The fact that
the term is used differently in Australia, the United States, and Canada
further complicates matters (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 359). Despite important
differences, however, forms of poststructuralism share certain assumptions
about language, meaning, and subjectivity. A common factor is the analysis
of language as “the place where social and political consequences are
defined and contested” (Weedon, 1987, pp. 20–21).
GROUNDS FOR CONSIDERATION
We come to critical pedagogy with a background in environmental thought
and education. Of primary concern and interest to us are relationships
among humans and the “more-than-human world” (Abram, 1996), the
ways in which those relationships are constituted and prescribed in mo-
dern industrial society, and the implications and consequences of those
constructs. As a number of scholars and nature advocates have argued, the
many manifestations of the current environmental crisis (e.g., species
extinction, toxic contamination, ozone depletion, topsoil depletion, climate
change, acid rain, deforestation) reflect predominant Western concepts of
nature, nature cast as mindless matter, a mere resource to be exploited for
human gain (Berman, 1981; Evernden, 1985; Merchant, 1980). An ability to
respond adequately to the situation therefore rests, at least in part, on a
willingness to critique prevailing discourses about nature and to consider
alternative representations (Cronon, 1996; Evernden, 1992; Hayles, 1995).
To this end, poststructuralist analysis has been and will continue to be
invaluable.
It would be an all-too-common mistake to construe the task at hand
as one of interest only to environmentalists. We believe, rather, that dis-
rupting the social scripts that structure and legitimize the human dom-
ination of nonhuman nature is fundamental not only to dealing with
environmental issues, but also to examining and challenging oppressive
social arrangements. The exploitation of nature is not separate from the
exploitation of human groups. Ecofeminists and activists for environ-
mental justice have shown that forms of domination are often intimately
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connected and mutually reinforcing (Bullard, 1993; Gaard, 1997; Lahar,
1993; Sturgeon, 1997). Thus, if critical educators wish to resist various
oppressions, part of their project must entail calling into question, among
other things, the instrumental exploitive gaze through which we humans
distance ourselves from the rest of nature (Carlson, 1995).
For this reason, the various movements against oppression need to be
aware of and supportive of each other. In critical pedagogy, however, the
exploration of questions of race, gender, class, and sexuality has proceeded
so far with little acknowledgement of the systemic links between human
oppressions and the domination of nature. The more-than-human world
and human relationships to it have been ignored, as if the suffering and
exploitation of other beings and the global ecological crisis were somehow
irrelevant. Despite the call for attention to voices historically absent from
traditional canons and narratives (Sadovnik, 1995, p. 316), nonhuman
beings are shrouded in silence. This silence characterizes even the work of
writers who call for a rethinking of all culturally positioned essentialisms.
Like other educators influenced by poststructuralism, we agree that
there is a need to scrutinize the language we use, the meanings we deploy,
and the epistemological frameworks of past eras (Luke & Luke, 1995,
p. 378). To treat social categories as stable and unchanging is to reproduce
the prevailing relations of power (Britzman et al., 1991, p. 89). What would
it mean, then, for critical pedagogy to extend this investigation and critique
to include taken-for-granted understandings of “human,” “animal,” and
“nature”?
This question is difficult to raise precisely because these understandings
are taken for granted. The anthropocentric bias in critical pedagogy man-
ifests itself in silence and in the asides of texts. Since it is not a topic of
discussion, it can be difficult to situate a critique of it. Following feminist
analyses, we find that examples of anthropocentrism, like examples of
gender symbolization, occur “in those places where speakers reveal the
assumptions they think they do not need to defend, beliefs they expect to
share with their audiences” (Harding, 1986, p. 112).
Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences
between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the
importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be
shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He
defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hier-
archical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he
reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the
objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to infuse the
world with their creative presence, to overcome situations that limit them,
and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90).
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Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their lack of
such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives
“totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but
to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they create
and transform and from which they can separate themselves, for animals
there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically
bound.”
To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals
only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and
though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we
as humans are somehow more unique. We have the edge over other crea-
tures because we are able to rise above monotonous, species-determined
biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be
our primary agenda. Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very
essence is to transform the world – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation,
wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale.
This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy.
The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is taken for granted, its
cultural and historical specificity not acknowledged. And therein lies the
problem. Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness
from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and
communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al.,
1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like
other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and con-
fronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enter-
prise is simply not questioned.
Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the en-
vironmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature
of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be
passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the
relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any
sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and
other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are relegated to
environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn,
remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell,
& Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged.1
ROOTS OF A CRITIQUE
Bowers (1993a, 1993b) has identified a number of root metaphors or “ana-
logs” in critical pedagogy that reinforce the problem of anthropocentric
thinking. These include the notion of change as inherently progressive,
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faith in the power of rational thought, and an understanding of individuals
as “potentially free, voluntaristic entities who will take responsibility for
creating themselves when freed from societal forms of oppression” (1993a,
pp. 25–26). Such assumptions, argues Bowers, are part of the Enlighten-
ment legacy on which critical pedagogy, and indeed liberal education
generally, is based. In other words, they are culturally specific and stem
from a period in Western history when the modern industrial world view
was beginning to take shape.
To be fair, Bowers understates the extent to which these assumptions are
being questioned within critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995;
Shapiro, 1994; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992, pp. 1, 5). Nevertheless, his main
point is well taken: proponents of critical pedagogy have yet to confront
the ecological consequences of an educational process that reinforces beliefs
and practices formed when unlimited economic expansion and social
progress seemed promised (Bowers, 1993b, p. 3). What happens when the
expansion of human possibilities is equated with the possibilities of con-
sumption? How is educating for freedom predicated on the exploitation of
the nonhuman? Such queries push against taken-for-granted understand-
ings of human, nature, self, and community, and thus bring into focus the
underlying tension between “freedom” as it is constituted within critical
pedagogy and the limits that emerge through consideration of humans’
interdependence with the more-than-human world.
This tension is symptomatic of anthropocentrism. Humans are assumed
to be free agents separate from and pitted against the rest of nature, our
fulfillment predicated on overcoming material constraints. This assumption
of human difference and superiority, central to Western thought since
Aristotle (Abram, 1996, p. 77), has long been used to justify the exploitation
of nature by and for humankind (Evernden, 1992, p. 96). It has also been
used to justify the exploitation of human groups (e.g., women, Blacks,
queers, indigenous peoples) deemed to be closer to nature – that is,
animalistic, irrational, savage, or uncivilized (Gaard, 1997; Haraway, 1989,
p. 30; Selby, 1995, pp. 17–20; Spiegel, 1988).
This “organic apartheid” (Evernden, 1992, p. 119) is bolstered by the
belief that language is an exclusively human property that elevates mere
biological existence to meaningful, social existence. Understood in this
way, language undermines our embodied sense of interdependence with
a more-than-human world. Rather than being a point of entry into the webs
of communication all around us, language becomes a medium through
which we set ourselves apart and above.
This view of language is deeply embedded in the conceptual framework
of critical pedagogy, including poststructuralist approaches. So too is the
human/nature dichotomy upon which it rests. When writers assume that
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“it is language that enables us to think, speak and give meaning to the
world around us,” that “meaning and consciousness do not exist outside
language” (Weedon, 1987, p. 32) and that “subjectivity is constructed by
and in language” (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378), then their transformative
projects are encoded so as to exclude any consideration of the nonhuman.
Such assumptions effectively remove all subjects from nature. As Evernden
(1992) puts it, “if subjectivity, willing, valuation, and meaning are securely
lodged in the domain of humanity, the possibility of encountering anything
more than material objects in nature is nil” (p. 108).
What is forgotten? What is erased when the real is equated with a
proliferating culture of commodified signs (see Luke & Luke, 1995, on
Baudrillard)? To begin, we forget that we humans are surrounded by an
astonishing diversity of life forms. We no longer perceive or give expres-
sion to a world in which everything has intelligence, personality, and
voice. Polyphonous echoes are reduced to homophony, a term Kane (1994)
uses to denote “the reduced sound of human language when it is used
under the assumption that speech is something belonging only to human
beings” (p. 192). We forget too what Abram (1996) describes as the gestural,
somatic dimension of language, its sensory and physical resonance that we
share with all expressive bodies (p. 80).
The vast forgetting to which these scholars allude is a culturally and
historically specific phenomenon. In Western culture, explains Evernden
(1992), it is to the Renaissance that we owe the modern conceptualization
of nature from which all human qualities, including linguistic expression,
have been segregated and dismissed as “projection.” Once scoured of any
normative content assigned to humanity, nature is strictly constrained,
knowable, and ours to interrogate (pp. 28, 39–40, 48). It is objectified as a
“thing,” whereas any status as agent or social being is reserved for humans
(Haraway, 1988, p. 592).
The language best suited to this cleansing of nature is that of the natural
sciences. Scientific accounts, written in language“exclusively descriptive
and avowedly neutral” (Evernden, 1992, p. 85), are widely regarded as
factual and unbiased and thus are granted a privileged role in naming
nature. As Haraway (1986) explains:
A scientist “names” nature in written, public documents, which are endowed with
the special, institutionally enforced quality of being perceived as objective and
applicable beyond the cultures of the people who wrote those documents. (p. 79)
According to Haraway (1986), the aesthetic of realism that underlies the
truth claims of the natural sciences means many practitioners tend to see
themselves not as interpreters but “as discoverers moving from description
to causal explanation” (p. 89).
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Haraway’s analysis reminds us that poststructuralism can and should
be used to call into question the universal legitimacy of science insofar as
it is used to explicate not only the human domain but also the natural
sciences. This questioning almost never takes place. Whereas accusations
of reductionism have been levelled at the biobehavioural sciences when
focused on humans (e.g., explaining behaviour solely in genetic terms),
rarely are these accusations made against similar studies on nonhumans
(Noske, 1997, p. 83). The reason, presumably, is that the sorts of questions
that could be raised about how culture, class, race, and gender shape
knowledge about human experience do not pertain to truth claims about
the nonhuman. Humans alone are understood to have histories open to
interpretation. Everything else is matter for measurement and prediction,
physical stuff that can be described and classified once and for all.
To move beyond such taken-for-granted notions of human and nature,
Evernden and Haraway suggest, we must admit into the conversation
some “non-common-sensical insights” and some “unsettling possibilities”
(Evernden, 1992, p. 102 and Haraway, 1988, p. 593, respectively). Haraway
(1992) writes of “otherworldly conversations,” a metaphor helpful in
pointing to the possibility of conversants in a discourse in which all of
the actors are not “us” (p. 84). To this end, we consider a few promising
reconceptualizations of what might constitute language, agency, and
meaningful existence beyond the human realm.
OTHERWORLDLY CONVERSATIONS
The human/nature dichotomy is not a frame of reference common to all
cultures, and although it prevails today in Western societies, even here
there are and always have been alternative ways of understanding and
giving expression to a more-than-human world. These can be found, for
example, in myth (Kane, 1994, p. 14), poetic expression, certain branches of
philosophy and environmental thought, natural history, and children’s
literature and films (Wilson, 1991, pp. 128–139, 154).
Even within the natural sciences, voices attest to the meaningful exist-
ence of nonhuman beings as subjects (McVay, 1993). In animal behaviour
research, for instance, numerous studies have challenged the assertion of
human superiority based on a narrow definition of language that excludes
nonhuman communication. Chimpanzee Washoe and orangutan Chantek
use American Sign Language, and other primates, like bonobo Kanzi, are
fluent in symbolic language, thereby altering the boundaries commonly
drawn between language and mere communication (Gardner, Gardner, &
Canfort, 1989; Miles, 1994; Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker, & Taylor, 1998).
And though the bilingual great apes may exhibit language patterns the
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most similar to those of humans, there are many examples of sophisticated
communication in other animals, including mammals, birds, and insects
(Griffin, 1992).
Meeting the criteria of language implies, of course, that these studies
compare and judge other animals against a human yardstick. In other
words, a hierarchical divide is still assumed, although its position may shift
somewhat to include, on humanity’s side, some of the “higher” animals.
For a more radical reframing, one that seeks to acknowledge all life
forms as subjects of significance, let us turn to the work of philosopher
David Abram. Drawing from phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Abram (1996) argues that all sensing bodies are active, open forms con-
stantly adjusting to a world that is itself continually shifting (p. 49). To
demonstrate how all beings incessantly improvise their relations to other
things he describes the spontaneous creativity of a spider:
Consider a spider weaving its web, for instance, and the assumption still held by
many scientists that the behavior of such a diminutive creature is thoroughly
“programmed in its genes.” Certainly, the spider has received a rich genetic in-
heritance from its parents and predecessors. Whatever “instructions,” however, are
enfolded within the living genome, they can hardly predict the specifics of the
microterrain within which the spider may find itself at any particular moment. They
could hardly have determined in advance the exact distances between the cave wall
and the branch that the spider is now employing as an anchorage point for her
current web, or the exact strength of the monsoon rains that make web-spinning a
bit more difficult on this evening. And so the genome could not explicitly have
commanded the order of every flexion and extension of her various limbs as she
weaves this web into its place. However complex are the inherited “programs,”
patterns, or predispositions, they must still be adapted to the immediate situation
in which the spider finds itself. However determinate one’s genetic inheritance, it
must still, as it were, be woven into the present, an activity that necessarily involves
both a receptivity to the specific shapes and textures of that present and a spon-
taneous creativity in adjusting oneself (and one’s inheritance) to those contours.
(Abram, 1996, p. 50)
An equally illuminating insect story, intended to evoke, once again, the
subjective world of a nonhuman being, is found in Evernden’s The Natural
Alien (1985, pp. 79–80). Borrowing from the work of biologist Jakob von
Uexkull, Evernden invites readers “to imagine that we are walking through
a meadow and that we discern ‘a soap bubble around each creature to
represent its own world, filled with the perceptions which it alone knows’ ”
(p. 79). He then attempts to describe what might be the world of a wood
tick. The wood tick, he explains, is literally and figuratively blind to the
world as we know it. What we readily perceive about our environment
would be unknown, unknowable, and irrelevant to her. Her world is
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composed of three elements: light, sweat, and heat. These are all that she
needs to complete her life cycle. Light will lead her to the top of a bush,
where she will cling (for as long as 18 years!) until the smell of sweat alerts
her to a passing animal. She will then drop, and if she lands on a warm
animal, she will indulge in a blood meal, fall to the ground, lay her eggs,
and die.
Like Abram, Evernden (1985) challenges commonplace, mechanistic
assumptions that reduce other life forms to programmed automatons and
intimates instead a meaningful life-world completely unlike and outside
our own:
To speak of reflexes and instincts is to obscure the essential point that the tick’s
world is a world, every bit as valid and adequate as our own. There is a subject, and
like all subjects it has its world . . . The tick is able to occupy a world that is per-
ceptually meaningful to it. Out of the thousands or millions of kinds of information
that might be had, the tick sees only what is of significance to it. The world is
tailored to the animal; they are entirely complementary . . . This is quite a different
view of existence from our usual one in which the animal is simply an exploiter of
certain natural resources. We are not talking just about observable interactions
between subjects and objects but rather about a very complete interrelation of
self and world, so complete that the world could serve as a definition of the self.
Without the tick there is no tick-world, no tick-space, no tick-time, – no tick-reality.
(pp. 80–81)
Evernden’s remarks are significant for the possibilities they open up in
our understanding both of the nonhuman and of ourselves. On one hand,
they contest the limited notion that awareness is a specifically human
attribute. On the other, they remind us that we humans too have bodies
that respond to light, sweat, and heat; we too know the world through our
bodies in a way that is not entirely dependent upon language; and this
bodily knowledge plays an important role in defining our world and
giving meaning to it.
SHARED CONVERSATIONS
In challenging anthropocentrism, the two of us find cause for hope in the
fact that our critique can be seen as compatible with the work of many
proponents of critical pedagogy. Specifically, attention to local contexts,
lived relationships, and embodied learning within critical pedagogy mat-
ches similar considerations within environmental thought and education.
The poststructuralist emphasis on societal narratives and language prac-
tices, already well developed in critical pedagogy, is likewise being taken
up by environmental scholars and educators. What strikes us as most
auspicious, then, is the potential for shared conversations, with insights
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from one field sparking unasked questions and opening up unexplored
pathways for another.
For instance, carrying forward the concerns and convictions of Dewey
(1938/1963) and the progressive education movement, theorists of critical
pedagogy have written extensively about the disjuncture between the
kinds of environments and interactions necessary for active and transform-
ative learning and the social relations we enter into through academic
training (e.g., McKenna, 1991). They recommend practices  situated in
students’ cultures (e.g., Shor, 1992, p. 44) and in the particular commun-
ities, schools, and other social groups of which students are a part (e.g.,
Walsh, 1991, p. 99). In so doing, they stress the importance of relationships,
contexts, and local histories in defining who we are, calling into question
the individualistic and universalistic narratives that shape curriculum and
schooling generally (e.g., Giroux, 1991, p. 24; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992,
pp. 1, 5).
So far, however, such queries in critical pedagogy have been limited by
their neglect of the ecological contexts of which students are a part and of
relationships extending beyond the human sphere. The gravity of this
oversight is brought sharply into focus by writers interested in environ-
mental thought, particularly in the cultural and historical dimensions of the
environmental crisis. For example, Nelson (1993) contends that our ina-
bility to acknowledge our human embeddedness in nature results in our
failure to understand what sustains us. We become inattentive to our very
real dependence on others and to the ways our actions affect them.
Educators, therefore, would do well to draw on the literature of environ-
mental thought in order to come to grips with the misguided sense of
independence, premised on freedom from nature, that informs such no-
tions as “empowerment.”
Further, calls for educational practices situated in the life-worlds of
students go hand in hand with critiques of disembodied approaches to
education. In both cases, critical pedagogy challenges the liberal notion of
education whose sole aim is the development of the individual, rational
mind (Giroux, 1991, p. 24; McKenna, 1991, p. 121; Shapiro, 1994). Theorists
draw attention to the importance of nonverbal discourse (e.g., Lewis &
Simon, 1986, p. 465) and to the somatic character of learning (e.g., Shapiro,
1994, p. 67), both overshadowed by the intellectual authority long granted
to rationality and science (Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995; S. Taylor, 1991).
Describing an “emerging discourse of the body” that looks at how bodies
are represented and inserted into the social order, S. Taylor (1991) cites as
examples the work of Peter McLaren, Michelle Fine, and Philip Corrigan.
A complementary vein of enquiry is being pursued by environmental
researchers and educators critical of the privileging of science and abstract
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thinking in education. They understand learning to be mediated not only
through our minds but also through our bodies. Seeking to acknowledge
and create space for sensual, emotional, tacit, and communal knowledge,
they advocate approaches to education grounded in, for example, nature
experience and environmental practice (Bell, 1997; Brody, 1997; Weston,
1996). Thus, whereas both critical pedagogy and environmental education
offer a critique of disembodied thought, one draws attention to the ways
in which the body is situated in culture (Shapiro, 1994) and to “the social
construction of bodies as they are constituted within discourses of race,
class, gender, age and other forms of oppression” (S. Taylor, 1991, p. 61).
The other emphasizes and celebrates our embodied relatedness to the
more-than-human world and to the myriad life forms of which it is
comprised (Payne, 1997; Russell & Bell, 1996). Given their different foci,
each stream of enquiry stands to be enriched by a sharing of insights.
Finally, with regard to the poststructuralist turn in educational theory,
ongoing investigations stand to greatly enhance a revisioning of environ-
mental education. A growing number of environmental educators question
the empirical-analytical tradition and its focus on technical and behavioural
aspects of curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Robottom, 1991). Advocating more
interpretive, critical approaches, these educators contest the discursive
frameworks (e.g., positivism, empiricism, rationalism) that mask the
values, beliefs, and assumptions underlying information, and thus the
cultural and political dimensions of the problems being considered
(A. Gough, 1997; Huckle, 1999; Lousley, 1999). Teaching about ecological
processes and environmental hazards in a supposedly objective and
rational manner is understood to belie the fact that knowledge is socially
constructed and therefore partial (A. Gough, 1997; Robertson, 1994;
Robottom, 1991; Stevenson, 1993).
N. Gough (1999) explicitly goes beyond critical approaches to advocate
poststructuralist positions in environmental education. He asks science and
environmental educators to adopt skepticism towards metanarratives, an
attitude that characterizes poststructuralist discourses. Working from the
assumption that science and environmental education are story-telling
practices, he suggests that the adequacy of narrative strategies be examined
in terms of how they represent and render problematic “human trans-
actions with the phenomenal world” (N. Gough, 1993, p. 607). Narrative
strategies, he asserts, should not create an illusion of neutrality, objectivity,
and anonymity, but rather draw attention to our kinship with nature and
to “the personal participation of the knower in all acts of understanding”
(N. Gough, 1993, p. 621).
We contend, of course, that Gough’s proposal should extend beyond the
work of science and environmental educators. The societal narratives that
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legitimize the domination of nature, like those that underlie racism, sexism,
classism, heterosexism, and so on, merit everyone’s concern. And since
the ecological crisis threatens especially those most marginalized and vul-
nerable (Running-Grass, 1996; D. Taylor, 1996), proponents of critical
pedagogy in particular need to come to terms with the human-centred
frameworks that structure their endeavours.
No doubt poststructuralist theory will be indispensable in this regard.
Nevertheless, anthropocentric assumptions about language, meaning, and
agency will need to be revisited. In the meantime, perhaps we can ponder
the spontaneous creativity of spiders and the life-worlds of woodticks.
Such wondrous possibilities should cause even the most committed of
humanists to pause for a moment at least.
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NOTE
1. Although the term anthropocentrism brings into play a hierarchical dualism that
can mask the complexity of human relationships with other forms of life and de-
emphasize the permeability of human/nonhuman borders, we find the word
helpful, if not indispensable, in naming and resisting a way of being in the world
that “places humanity and human interests at the center of value” (Katz, 1997,
p. 122).
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